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·· . . STATEMENT OF-THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Troy Dwayne Payne appeals from the district court's order dismissing his petition 
for post-conviction relief. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
In its decision on Payne's underlying criminal case, State v. Payne, Docket No. 
38918, 2012 Unpublished Op. No. 573 (Idaho App., August 2, 2012), the Court of 
Appeals offered the following factual background for this case: 
On April 6, 2009, without any prior notice, Payne went to the home 
of a law enforcement officer and handed the officer a small container filled 
with methamphetamine. According to Payne's subsequent trial testimony, 
the officer agreed to allow him to turn in the methamphetamine "without 
repercussions" and "with no strings attached." However, the officer 
testified that he told Payne only that the officer would not pursue charges 
if Payne entered drug rehabilitation treatment and provided information to 
the police, presumably regarding the source of the drugs. Payne refused 
to cooperate with the police, however, and was eventually charged with 
possession of a controlled substance, I.C. § 37-2732(c)(1 ), for possessing 
the methamphetamine that he gave to the officer. 
Shortly after the jury was empaneled, the State notified the court 
that it anticipated that Payne would testify regarding his motive for 
possessing methamphetamine, and the State orally moved to preclude 
such testimony on grounds of irrelevance. Defense counsel confirmed 
that Payne planned to present a defense that he did not intend to possess 
the methamphetamine. Defense counsel said that Payne would testify 
about his motive and intent in order to demonstrate that he possessed the 
methamphetamine for the sole purpose of delivering it to the police. The 
district court repeatedly declined to rule on the State's motion regarding 
the admissibility of such testimony, preferring to wait until Payne testified. 
Payne ultimately was allowed to testify that an acquaintance tossed the 
container into his car, and that in an effort to "do the right thing" he took it 
to the police as soon as he realized that it contained drugs. The jury 
returned a guilty verdict and Payne appeal[ed], contending that the district 
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court erroneously prevented him from presenting a defense that he lacked 
the requisite intent for the offense. 
kL pp.1-2. The Court of Appeals upherd Payne's conviction finding that he was, in fact, 
able to present his proffered defense. lsL pp.6-7. 
On August 22, 2013, Payne filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief, in 
which he alleged that his trial attorney had been ineffective for failing to (1) raise 
affirmative defenses of (a) innocent and/or temporary possession or (b) misfortune and 
(2) request jury instructions on those defenses; or in the alternative that appellate 
counsel had been ineffective for failing to argue that the jury should have been 
instructed on innocent and/or temporary possession. (R., pp.4-14.) Payne also 
included an affidavit from one of the jurors from his trial. (R., pp.16-18.) The state 
moved to strike the affidavit as inadmissible evidence under Idaho Rule of Evidence 
606(b). (R., pp.147-48.) Payne objected to the motion but conceded that "enumerated 
statements 3, 7, and 8 are inadmissible" under Rule 606(b). (R., pp.150-53.) 
The state then filed a motion for summary dismissal arguing that (1) Payne had 
failed to raise a material issue of fact showing that his attorney was ineffective for failing 
to raise an affirmative defense that had not been recognized in Idaho; (2) appellate 
counsel also was not ineffective for failing to present the unrecognized defense; and (3) 
Payne had failed to raise a material issue of fact showing that his counsel was 
ineffective for failing to raise the affirmative defense of "misfortune" because it did not 
apply to drug possession and Payne was not prejudiced regardless. (R., pp.164-76, 
196-204.) The district court granted the state's motion for summary dismissal. (R., 
pp.205-14.) Payne filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.216-18.) 
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ISSUE 
Payne's statement of the issues on appeal is found at page 8 of his Appellant's 
brief and is lengthy. The state rephrases the issue as: 
Has Payne failed to show error in the district court's summary dismissal of his 
petition for post-conviction relief? 
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ARGUMENT 
Payne Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Order Summarily Dismissing 
His Petition For Post-Conviction Relief 
A Introduction 
In his post-conviction petition, Payne asserted that he was entitled to relief 
because, he claimed, his attorney rendered ineffective assistance by (1) failing to 
"present the affirmative defense of 'innocent possession' or 'temporary possession"' and 
request a jury instruction on the same; and (2) "failing to raise and request jury 
instructions for the affirmative defense of 'misfortune or accident' pursuant to I.C. § 18-
201 (3)." (R., pp.6-8.) Payne also claimed that his appellate counsel was ineffective. 
(R., p.8.) The district court summarily dismissed Payne's petition. (R., pp.205-12.) On 
appeal, Payne argues that the district court erred by dismissing his post-conviction 
claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. (Appellant's brief, pp.9-17.) However, 
application of the correct legal standards to the facts of this case shows that summary 
dismissal was appropriate. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an 
evidentiary hearing, this Court will determine whether a genuine issue of fact exists 
based on the pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any affidavits on file 
.... " Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 523, 164 P.3d 798, 803 (2007) (citing Gilpin-
Grubb v. State, 138 Idaho 76, 80, 57 P.3d 787, 791 (2002)). 
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The District Court Correctly Dismissed Payne's Post-Conviction Petition 
Post-conviction proceedings are governed by the Uniform Post-Conviction 
Procedure Act. I.C. § 19-4901, et seq. A petition for post-conviction relief initiates a 
new and independent civil proceeding in which the petitioner bears the burden of 
establishing that he is entitled to relief. Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P .3d at 802; 
State v. Bearshield, 104 Idaho 676, 678, 662 P.2d 548, 550 (1983). Generally, the 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure apply to petitions for post-conviction relief. Pizzuto v. 
State, 146 Idaho 720, 724, 202 P.3d 642, 646 (2008). However, unlike other civil 
complaints, in post-conviction cases the "application must contain much more than a 
short and plain statement of the claim that would suffice for a complaint under I.R.C.P. 
8(a)(1)." Monahan v. State, 145 Idaho 872, 875, 187 P.3d 1247, 1250 (Ct. App. 2008) 
(quoting Goodwin v. State, 138 Idaho 269, 271, 61 P.3d 626, 628 (Ct. App. 2002)). 
Instead, the application must be supported by a statement that "specifically set[s] forth 
the grounds upon which the application is based." kl (citing I.C. § 19-4903). "The 
application must present or be accompanied by admissible evidence supporting its 
allegations, or the application will be subject to dismissal." State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 
548,561,199 P.3d 123,136 (2008) (citing I.C. § 19-4903). 
Idaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal of an application for post-
conviction relief on the trial court's own initiative or in response to a party's motion. "To 
withstand summary dismissal, a post-conviction applicant must present evidence 
establishing a prima facie case as to each element of the claims upon which the 
applicant bears the burden of proof." State v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53, 72, 90 P.3d 278, 
297 (2003) (citing Pratt v. State, 134 Idaho 581, 583, 6 P.3d 831, 833 (2000)). Thus, a 
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claim for post-conviction relief is subject to summary dismissal "if the applicant's 
evidence raises no genuine issue of material fact" as to each element of the petitioner's 
claims. Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 802 (citing I.C. § 19-4906(b), (c)); 
Lovelace, 140 Idaho at 72, 90 P.3d at 297. While a court must accept a petitioner's 
unrebutted allegations as true, the court is not required to accept either the applicant's 
mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible evidence, or the applicant's 
conclusions of law. Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 802 (citing Ferrier v. 
State, 135 Idaho 797,799, 25 P.3d 110,112 (2001)). The trial court is not required to 
conduct an evidentiary hearing prior to dismissing the petition when the alleged facts, 
even if true, would not entitle the petitioner to relief. kl (citing Stuart v. State, 118 Idaho 
865, 869, 801 P.2d 1216, 1220 (1990)). "Allegations contained in the application are 
insufficient for the granting of relief when (1) they are clearly disproved by the record of 
the original proceedings, or (2) do not justify relief as a matter of law." kl 
Where the petitioner alleges entitlement to relief based on ineffective assistance 
of counsel, he must show that his attorney's performance was objectively deficient and 
that he was prejudiced by that deficiency. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-
88 (1984); Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 760-61, 760 P.2d 1174, 1176-77 (1988). To 
establish deficient performance, the petitioner must overcome the strong presumption 
that counsel's performance was adequate and "show that his attorney's conduct fell 
below an objective standard of reasonableness." Baldwin v. State, 145 Idaho 148, 154, 
177 P.3d 362, 368 (2008) (citations omitted). "[S]trategic or tactical decisions will not be 
second-guessed on appeal unless those decisions are based on inadequate 
preparation, ignorance of relevant law, or other shortcomings capable of objective 
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evaluation." kl To establish prejudice, the petitioner must show "a reasonable 
probability that but for his attorney's deficient performance the outcome the 
proceeding would have been different." kl 
Articulating and applying relevant legal standards, the district court addressed 
and properly dismissed Payne's ineffective assistance of counsel claims because he 
failed to present admissible evidence establishing a prima facie case supporting them. 
(R., pp.205-12.) Payne failed to present sufficient evidence to make a prima facie case 
of deficient performance regarding his attorney not presenting the defense or requesting 
an instruction on innocent possession, which has never been recognized in Idaho. (R., 
pp.210-11.) Payne failed to present sufficient evidence to make a prima facie case of 
either deficient performance or prejudice in his attorney's not presenting the defense of 
misfortune or accident. (R., pp.211-12.) 
On appeal, Payne represents that the district court dismissed his claims of 
ineffective assistance of counsel on the basis that "the propriety of jury instructions is 
not ordinarily a matter that can be asserted in post-conviction." (Appellant's brief, 
pp.10-11, 16.) Payne appears to misunderstand the district court's order. The issue 
was whether Payne had presented evidence showing that his defense counsel's 
performance fell below an objective standard, an issue the district court squarely 
decided. (See R., pp.210-12.) Payne wanted the court to presume deficient 
performance based only on defense counsel not requesting certain jury instructions. 
(Id.) The district court would not presume deficient performance, especially where the 
propriety of the jury instructions needed to be raised on direct appeal. (Id.) Reviewing 
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Court of Appeals' decision, the district court could not find that either proposed jury 
instruction should have been given. (Id.) 
Defense counsel's alleged failure to present the affirmative defense of "innocent 
possession" or to request a jury instruction on the same cannot raise even a prima facie 
case of objectively deficient performance because that affirmative defense has never 
been recognized in Idaho. "Although the failure to advance an established legal theory 
may result in ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland, the failure to advance a 
novel theory will not." Piro v. State, 146 Idaho 86, 91, 190 P.3d 905, 910 (Ct App. 
2008); see also Schoger v. State, 148 Idaho 622, 630, 226 P.3d 1269, 1277 (2010). 
Having failed to show that defense counsel was deficient for failing to present a novel 
defense, Payne failed to make a prima facie showing of ineffective assistance of 
counsel on this claim. 
Though the defense of misfortune or accident is an "established legal theory" in 
Idaho, that alone is insufficient to show ineffective assistance of counsel. Even 
assuming, arguendo, that the defense of misfortune would apply to the facts of Payne's 
criminal proceeding below and defense counsel should have requested a jury 
instruction on that defense, Payne still failed to present a prima facie case of ineffective 
assistance of counsel because he failed to present any admissible evidence of 
prejudice. On appeal, Payne relies on an affidavit submitted by one of the jurors from 
his trial, Ms. Junger; specifically her statement that she may have voted to acquit Payne 
had there been an affirmative defense instruction. (See Appellant's brief, pp.14-17.) 
But this statement was inadmissible. 
Idaho Rule of Evidence 606(b) provides: 
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Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not 
testify as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of the 
jury's deliberations or to the effect of anything upon the juror's or any other 
juror's mind or emotions as influencing the juror to assent to or dissent 
from the verdict or indictment or concerning the juror's mental processes 
in connection therewith, nor may a juror's affidavit or evidence of any 
statement by the juror concerning a matter about which the juror would be 
precluded from testifying be received for these purposes, but a juror may 
testify on the questions whether extraneous prejudicial information was 
improperly brought to the jury's attention or whether any outside influence 
was improperly brought to bear upon any juror and may be questioned 
about or may execute an affidavit on the issue of whether or not the jury 
determined any issue by resort to chance. 
I.R.E. 606(b) (emphasis added). Payne conceded below that "enumerated statements 
3, 7, and 8," the only statements with any relevance to Payne's prejudice argument on 
appeal, were "inadmissible because they address matters and statements made during 
the course of juror deliberations." (R., pp.151-52 (emphasis original).) If the district 
court considered any of those statements from the Junger affidavit, it did so erroneously 
under Rule 606(b). Were this Court to consider any of those inadmissible statements 
on appeal, it would also do so in error. 
In the absence of the concededly inadmissible statements from the Junger 
affidavit, Payne has failed to present evidence raising even a prima facie case that he 
was prejudiced by defense counsel's failure to request an instruction on misfortune. 
Having failed to present admissible evidence of prejudice, Payne failed to make a prima 
facie showing of ineffective assistance of counsel on this claim. 
Because Payne failed to make a prima facie showing of ineffective assistance of 
counsel on either theory, the district court correctly dismissed his petition for post-
conviction relief. The district court's order should be affirmed. 
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CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm 
summarily dismissing Payne's petition for post-conviction relief. 
DATED this 27th day of October, 2015. 
district 
/9/~ 
~-Scc..-P_E_N_C_E_R ___ _ 
Deputy Attorney General 
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